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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TED R. BROWN AND ASSOCIATES, 
INC., a corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
Supreme Court No. 15928 
CARNES CORPORATION, 
and 
Defendant and 
Respondent, 
LONG DEMING UTAH, INC., 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELL&~T 
STATEMENT OF THE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The prolonged proceedings in the lower Court in this 
matter requires, in the opinion of Appellant's Counsel, a 
more complete explanation in this brief than the usual desired 
one sentence statement suggested by the Rules as to the Nature 
of the case. This matter has been before the Courts since 
October 26, 1973. There have been two prior references to this 
Court. Accordingly, Appellant undertakes to make a more meaning-
ful Statement of the Nature of the Case, which hopefully may 
assist the Court to an early understanding of the problem and 
to make more pertinent the exposition of the details which will 
be later set out in the brief. 
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Appellant, Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc., is a Utah 
Corporation. Under a written Sales Representative Agreement 
with Carnes Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation, it performed 
services in the sale of Carnes products to the L.D.S. Church 
which Brownbelieves entitles it to the payment of a commission 
by Carnes in the amount of some Fifty Thousand Dollars. Before 
payment of the commission which Brown believed it earned, 
Carnes cancelled the Sales Representative Agreement with Brown, 
and entered into an agreement with Long Deming Utah, Inc., a 
Utah corporation. Subsequently, Brown was informed, Carnes 
paid the commission which Brown believed itself to be entitledto, 
to Long Deming Utah, Inc. Since the entire matter arose out 
of the construction of the L.D.S. Church Office Building, the 
actions "rh1.ch :;a•re rise to the claim took place in Utah, in-
volved pr1.mar1~i ~tah people, and two Utah corporations. Brown 
and its counsel believed that the proper forum for presentation 
of the cause was the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Accordingly, Brown filed its 
complaint there October 26, 1973. Counsel for Brown had no 
doubt, applying the then recognized standards for securing 
jurisdiction over the out of State Wisconsin corporation that 
it could be accomplished both under the Utah Long Arm Statute 
78-27-22 et seq. UCA 1953 as amended, and also under the 
provisions of Rule 4(e)(4) URCP. Summons was accordingly 
served in both manners upon Carnes. The matter now before this 
Court involves solely the effort by Brown to secure jurisdiction 
-2-
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of the Utah Court. The merits of the case have never been 
Fresented or considered. 
This case has been twice previously before this Court on 
various aspects of the effort by Aprellant to secure juris-
diction over the Respondent Carnes Corporation in the State of 
Utah. The first time upon an Interlocutory Appeal sought by 
Carnes Corporation from an Order of Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, vacating an attach-
ment issued by that Court against Carnes and ruling that Carnes, 
in asking that the attachment be vacated and that t:1e Utah law 
on attachment be declared unconstitutional, had made a general 
appearance and was subject to the jurisdiction of the Court. 
This Court granted the Appeal and ruled that Carnes had not 
made a general appearance, docket number 14057. This case 
was before this Court once again on a second petition by 
Respondent Carnes for Interlocutory Appeal from an Order of 
the Honorable David Dee, Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court, granting a special setting and hearing on the jurisdic-
tional facts to Brown. The second petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal was denied by this court, docket number 15564. The 
present Appeal is the first brought before this Court by 
Appellant Brown. At the present stage of this case, Long 
Deming Utah, Inc., defendant, is not involved in the Appeal. 
The present conflict involves solely the effort by the plaintiff 
Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc. to establish jurisdiction 
over the defendant Carnes. Carnes Corporation was originally 
-3-
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a Wisconsin corporation and is presently an unincorporated 
division of WEHR CORPORATION, a Wisconsin corporation. (R255) 
More than five years before the Court has been consumed in the 
effort by the plaintiff and Appellant Ted R. Brown and 
Associates, Inc. to establish jurisdiction over Carnes. The 
case presents clearly the difficulty and frustration encountered 
by the plaintiff and its counsel in attempting to achieve what 
should be a litigant's primary right, to have the Court permit 
the adequate development of the facts and then to examine and 
apply the applicable law thereto. This simple goal has not 
yet been achieved. The review of this case will necessitate 
a painstaking and detailed examination of the entire record 
of the proceedings in the Court below. We recognize that in 
a fifty pac2 ~r~ef, we can only hope to highlight the signi-
ficant problems. We earnestly beseech this Court to afford 
this matter the careful consideration that the basic issues 
involved herein entitle it to receive. The decision should 
not be based upon technicalities of inter Court relationships 
between Judges of the same Court, nor upon one Judge's view 
of the act~ons of counsel which counsel has never been asked 
or allowed to explain to the Court. 
The plaintiff-Appellant, Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc., 
will throughout this brief be referred to as either Brown, or 
as Appellant. The defendant, Carnes Corporation, will be 
referred to hereinafter as Carnes or Respondent. 
-4-
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
Initially Judge Gordon R. Hall entered an Order Dismiss-
ing the claims and quashing service of Summons on Carnes. 
(Rll7) On application made by Brown for reconsideration and 
to vacate the Order the Order was amended by striking the 
portion which dismissed the claims of Brown, but left standing 
the portion which quashed service of Summons on Carnes. (R74-75) 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. issued an attachment on funds of 
Carnes on application of Brown which he subsequently vacated 
but entered an Order declaring Carnes subject to jurisdiction 
of the Court by reason of a general appearance. (R65) The 
Supreme Court overturned Judge Hanson's ruling on Interlocu-
tory Appeal by Carnes, Supreme Court Docket No. 14057. Judge G. 
Hal Taylor refused to consider a motion to declare jurisdic-
tion established over Carnes and that an Order be issued to 
require answer or be declared in default, stating that there 
was no precedent therefore nor any rule under which he could 
so uct and he, therefore, denied the motion. (R224) After 
re-service of Summons and a new Motion to Quash, Judge David 
Dee issued an Order granting to Brown a special hearing at 
which evidence could be introduced and testimony be taken 
relative to: (a) Carnes activities in the State of Utah 
which would subject it to jurisdiction under the Long Arm 
Statute; and (b) The nature of the relationship of Carnes 
to its sales representative to determine whether service 
thereon would meet the requirements of Rule 4 (e) (4) URCP. (R304) 
-5-
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Carnes petitioned for Interlocutory Appeal of Judge Dee's 
Order. This petition was denied, Supreme Court Docket No. 
15564. After the evidentiary hearing before Judge Leary, 
held pursuant to the requirements of Judge Dee's Order, Judge 
Leary entered an Order refusing to consider the facts on the 
question of jurisdiction and, in effect, imposing sanctions 
for what he app~rently considered on his own motion and with-
out notice to counsel or an opportunity to respond thereto, 
a failure by counsel for Brown to conduct adequate discovery 
and entered an Order of Dismissal declaring himself to be 
bound by the earlier ruling of Judge Hall. (R350-357) 
NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have both the Order of Gordon R. Hall 
and the Order of Peter F. Leary granting the motion of the 
defendant C3rnes for dismissal and quashing service of Summons 
reversed and vacated. Appellant asks this Court to recognize 
the sufficiency of the service of Summons upon the defendant 
Carnes and the jurisdiction of the District Court of Salt Lake 
County over the defendant Carnes. The case should be remanded 
to the District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Carnes 
should be allowed to plead to the Amended Complaint and the 
case should be tried on the merits. 
STATEMEN~ OF FACTS 
As previously stated in the introduction to this brief, 
this appeal involves solely the effort of Appellant to obtain 
-6-
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jurisdiction over the Respondent Carnes in a lawsuit commenced 
in the District Court of Salt Lake County. Appellant filed 
its Complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
October 26, 1973, in which Appellant is named as plaintiff, 
the defendant Carnes Corporation is named as defendant and 
Long Deming Utah, Inc. is named as a defendant. (Rl60-l63) 
The Complaint alleges that Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, had a Sales Representative Agreement with 
Carnes Corporation whereby Ted R. Brown and Associates sold 
products of Carnes Corporation in the State of Utah. (Rl60-16l) 
Acting in collaboration with participating Carnes personnel, 
Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc. sold a specifically fabri-
cated product and other material manufactured by Carnes and 
used in the heating and air conditioning systems of the new 
church office building constructed in Salt Lake City for the 
L.D.S. Church. (Rl60-16l,R537 through 542) Before the Church 
Office Building was constructed, but after the Carnes material 
had been selected by the Church architect and incorporated in 
the specifications due to Brown's efforts, (R523-530) Carnes 
Corporation cancelled Brown's representative agreement and 
appointed Long Deming Utah, Inc. as its sales representative 
in Utah (Rl61-162). Carnes refused to pay to Ted R. Brown and 
Associates, Inc. the commission which it had earned for sale 
of the Church Office Building job and to which Ted R. Brown 
and Associates laid claim. (Rl60-l63) Brown learned that the 
commission had been paid to Long Deming Utah, Inc. This action 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was commenced to recover the commission from Carnes and from 
Long Deming Utah, Inc. and damages for the failure to honor 
the contract with Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc. (Rl60-
163) Appellant, through its counsel, caused Summons to be 
issued upon the Complaint and service was duly made upon Long 
Deming Utah, Inc. as sales representative of Carnes Corporation 
in Utah, by serving Lynn Felton, an officer of Long Deming 
Utah, Inc. (Rl56) This service was made pursuant to the pro-
visions of Rule 4 (e) ( 4) URCP. Brown also caused Summons to 
be served under the Long Arm Statute of Utah, 78-27-22 et seq., 
UCA 1953 as amended, on Carnes by making personal service on 
Richard Nichols, a Vice President of Carnes Corporation at the 
home office of the company at Verona, Dane County, Wisconsin. 
(Rl59) Long Deming Utah, Inc. answered to the Complaint within 
the tine allo~~ed. (Rl41-143) Carnes, through its counsel, 
filed a Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss. (Rl39) It should 
be noted that the motion was filed November 29, 1973, and 
recited that an affidavit in support thereof would be filed 
subsequently, that it was then in preparation. (Rl39) The 
affidavit of Richard Nichols was not filed until January 4, 
19 7 4 . ( Rl3 5 ) Due to the many factors which do not appear in 
the record because no issue has at any time been raised in 
regard thereto, the motion was not called up for hearing before 
the Court until October l, 1974. (Rl24) It was called up, as 
is the usual procedure, before the Law and Motion Division of 
the Court. The matter was presented on oral argument and the 
-8-
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affidavit of Nichols (Rl35-l37) and of Ted R. Brown (Rl33-l34), 
~lr. 0. l'lcod Moyle III appearing for Carnes and Craig G. Adamson 
appearing for Brown. Judge Hall took the matter under advise-
ment and subsequently, on October 18, 1974, entered an Order 
dismissing the claims of the plaintiff Brown and quashing the 
service of Summons against Carnes. (Rll7-ll8) Appellant, on 
October 25, 1974, fil"ed a Motion for Reconsideration or to 
Vacate or in the Alternative Amend the Judgement. (Rll3) This 
motion was not immediately called up for hearing before the 
Court by Appellant because in the meantime counsel for the 
Appellant had learned that the final payment for the construc-
tion of the L.D.S. Church Office Building had not been made 
and that, possibly, the Church or the general contractor might 
still have funds which would be ultimately paid to Carnes. 
Accordingly, on November 4, 1974, Appellant applied to the 
Court for issuance of a Writ of Attachment. (Rl09) The Writ 
was issued and served. (R57, 44, 55, 56, 107) No funds were 
attached, however, both parties attached advising they held 
no such funds. (R77) Mr. Moyle on behalf of Carnes filed a 
Motion to Release the Attachment on the grounds that there was 
no Complaint on file within the meaning of Rule 64C, that the 
Rule 64C did not comply with the Constitution of the United 
States, and further alleging that the attachment was not 
issued in compliance with Rule 64C. (Rl02) On January 8, 1975, 
-9-
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being apprised that the parties attached claimed not to have 
any funds belonging to Carnes and seeking to elicit further 
information which might possibly be used at a future hearing 
on the motion pending before Judge Hall, Appellant served a 
Notice of Taking of Deposition of the Vice President of Long 
Deming Utah, Inc., Lynn Felton. (Rl03) This was promptly 
met by counsel for Long Deming Utah, Inc., who filed a Motion 
for Protective Order and to Quash Request for Production of 
Documents (R99-l00) on January 14, 1975. A reply to this 
Motion for Protective Order was filed by Appellant on January 
16, 1975. On January 16, 1975, counsel for Carnes called up 
by Notice of Hearing, the motion pending before Judge Hall 
for reconsideration of the Judgment entered by him and also 
the motion o= Carnes for release of attachment. (R93) This 
was tc C:1e ~~card January 23, 1975. (R93) An amended Notice 
of Hearing dated January 17, 1975, and filed by counsel for 
Carnes on January 20, 1975, rescheduled the proposed hearing 
to February 11, 1975, at 9:00 a.m. (R95) At the hearing 
before Judge Hall on this Motion, he was requested by counsel 
for the Appellant to vacate his Order Quashing Service of 
Summons and set the matter for a hearing at which the facts 
concerning the activities of Carnes in the State of Utah 
might be shown by an evidentiary hearing which could not be 
had before the Law and Motion Division. Judge Hall recognized 
his error in dismissing the plaintiff's claims and amended 
his Order by striking the portion of the Order which so 
-10-
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provided, but he refused to reconsider the Order to Quash 
Service of Summons and denied the verbal request for a further 
hearing on that matter. (R74-75) Judge Hall refused to con-
sider the matter of the release of attachment stating that 
since this was issued by Judge Hanson, it would have to be 
pre sen ted to Judge Hanson. ( R7 5) The Order of Judge Hall 
was entered on March 5, 1975. Thereafter Appellant, acting 
under Rule 72(a) preserved its right of appeal from Judge 
Hall's Order by filing a Notice of Intention to Appeal. (R70) 
On March 18, 1975, Appellant filed a Motion for Order Deter-
mining Defendant Carnes had Entered a General Appearance, 
Declaring Jurisdiction of the Court over Carnes, and Requiring 
Carnes to Answer to the Complaint. This motion together with 
the Motion of Long Deming for a protective Order and the 
Motion to Release the Attachment, filed by Carnes, were all 
noticed up for hearing before Judge Hanson on the 26th day of 
Narch, 1975. (R68) On the day appointed, all parties appeared 
by counsel and the matters were argued to the Court. (R65) 
Judge Hanson ordered the attachment released for irregulari-
ties in compliance with rules relating to pre-judgment attach-
ments, but held that Carnes, in seeking a Constitutional 
determination on the matter of the attachment procedures and 
Rules in Utah, had entered a general appearance and ordered 
that Carnes answer to the Complaint within ten days from the 
entry of the Order. The parties stipulated that the matter 
of the protective Order sought by Long Deming had in part been 
-11-
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rendered moot by the other rulings of the Court and accordingly 
the Court struck the matter from the calendar to be recalled 
when and if desired by either party. (R65-66) 
Carnes promptly petitioned for an Interlocutory Appeal 
to this Court from the Order of Judge Hanson. The appeal was 
granted. This Court ruled that Carnes had not made a general 
appearance and that the Order of Judge Hanson in so determining 
and requiring Carnes to answer should be and was set aside. 
(Docket No. 14057 in the Supreme Court) To re-activate the 
proceedings in the District Court, Appellant elected to file 
a Hotion Declaring Service of Summons on Carnes Sufficient 
and requesting that the Court order Carnes to Answer or be 
found in default. (Rl98) This matter was called up before 
Judge G. Hal Taylor who was at that time sitting on law and 
mot:w:-,, to be heard on February 17, 1977. (R219) At the 
hearing counsel for Brown moved the Court to set a special 
hearing at which evidence could be presented concerning the 
activities of Carnes in the State of Utah which Appellant 
believed sufficient to subject it to the jurisdiction of the 
Utah Courts. Judge Taylor stated that he could find no rule 
under which the motion presented could be made and refused to 
consider the same on the ground that there was no precedent 
therefore and the Court had no authority to make such an Order. 
The Court also denied the Motion made orally for a hearing on 
the evidence. (R221, 222, 223) 
-12-
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Acting under Rule 4(b) where service has been obtained 
upon one defendant within the year, (service having been 
had on Long Deming Utah, Inc.) Appellant issued a new Summons 
and caused the same to be served on the newly appointed sales 
representative for Carnes, Utemp - Utah Air Sales, which was 
duly served by the Sheriff on Richard Bartlett McDowell, an 
officer of Utemp -Utah Air Sales. (R230) Appellant also 
caused service under the Long Arm Statute to be made by 
making service upon an officer of the Carnes Company at its 
home office in Verona, Wisconsin. The Sheriff served Bruce 
J. Kessler, process agent. (R234-235) Appellant had preserved 
its right to appeal from the Order entered by G. Hal Taylor 
by filing a Notice of Intention to Appeal under Rule 72(a). 
(R227) Carnes, again acting through its attorney, 0. Wood 
Moyle III, filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R232) Instead of 
calling up this new Motion to Dismiss before the Law and 
Motion Division of the Court for hearing, Appellant filed a 
motion asking that a special hearing be granted at which 
evidence and testimony could be presented before the Court 
on the activities of Carnes in the State of Utah, and of the 
activities of Utemp - Utah Air Sales, its sales representative. 
(R237-238) This matter was heard before Judge David Dee on 
August 23, 1977 at 2:00p.m. Judge Dee heard the arguments 
of counsel, reviewed the record and considered the affidavit 
filed by the parties as well as the extensive memoranda sub-
mitted by counsel in support of their respective positions 
-13-
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and then made and entered a memorandum decision followed by 
an Order based thereon which granted the special hearing 
requested by Appellant and provided: 
"ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
"1. The motion of the plaintiff for 
an order designating a special setting 
for an evidentiary hearing is granted 
and said hearing shall not be limited 
solely to evidence concerning the service 
of process on Richard Barrett McDowell. 
The parties shall be permitted to present 
all evidence pertinent to determination 
of the question of whether or not Carnes 
was doing business in the State of Utah 
so as to subject said corporation to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this State. 
"2. Counsel for the plaintiff shall 
arrange for such evidentiary hearing before 
one of the judges assigned to the Trial 
Division of this Court. 
"3. The claim of the defendant Carnes 
in support of its motion to dismjss, that 
the entire issue of jurisdiction of the 
Court over the defendant Carnes is Res 
Judlcata, is denied." (R304) 
Carnes, through its counsel, objected to the Order and a 
further hearing was granted but the Court entered an Order 
denying and overruling the objections of Carnes to the above 
mentioned Order. (R302-303) This Order was entered November 
17, 1977. Carnes promptly petitioned the Supreme Court for 
an Interlocutory Appeal on the ground that the matter of 
jurisdiction over Carnes was res judicata by reason of Judge 
Hall's and Judge Taylor's rulings and that therefore Judge 
Dee could not make such an Order. Appellant answered Carne's 
petition for Interlocutory Appeal. The Supreme Court entered 
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an Order on January 11, 1978, denying the Interlocutor~ 
Appeal. (See the Record on the petition and supporting 
memoranda in the file of this Court under docket number 
15564, also R320.) 
Appellant in compliance with the Order of Judge Dee 
arranged a hearing at which evidence could be adduced and 
testimony of witnesses taken. This hearing was scheduled 
before the Honorable Judge Peter F. Leary on January 11, 1978, 
at 10:00 a.m. (R308) A full hearing was held before the 
Court, both Appellant and Carnes presented evidence and 
Witnesses. A comprehensive statement of the prior pro-
ceedings and the status of the matter was made to the Court 
by counsel for both parties. (R405-424) The proceedings 
before Judge Leary continued through January 12, 1978. 
Judge Leary was fully advised by counsel of the Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal taken to the Supreme Court from Judge 
Dee's Order on grounds that the issue of jurisdiction over 
Carnes was res judicata by virtue of the Order previously 
entered by Judge Hall, and was notified that the Petition 
had been denied and a copy of the Notice of the decision of 
the Supreme Court was filed with the Court. (R320,419) The 
position of the parties was fully argued to the Court. Judge 
Leary took the matter under advisement. He subsequently, on 
March 31, 1978, entered a memorandum decision. (R322-326) The 
decision ignored the facts presented and totally failed to 
comply with the terms of the Order of Judge Dee which was the 
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basis for the hearing before Judge Leary. (R322-326) A 
proposed Order was presented and Appellant promptly presented 
objections to the Order of Judge Leary Quashing Service of 
Process on Carnes. (R342-347) A hearing was had before Judge 
Leary on the objections on May 2, 1978, at 1:00 p.m. Judge 
Leary expressed himself as dissatisfied with the Order presented 
by Counsel for Carnes, 
"The Court will take a look at the matter. 
But I would--do make this comment, Mr. 
Hovle: that I don't think that the 
Order which was prepared for the Court's 
signature precisely sets forth what the 
Court intended by its memorandum decision. 
I' 11 take a look at it." (R395) 
In fact, Judge Leary did nothing and the Order objected 
to by Appellant was entered. This appeal is prosecuted from 
that Order and from the other orders denying the jurisdiction 
over Carnes the right of appeal from which had been preserved 
under Rule 72(a) as more particularly hereinbefore delineated 
in this statement of facts. 
The facts developed in the evidentiary hearing before 
Judge Leary on January 11 and 12, 1978, supported the initial 
affidavit of Ted R. Brown which reflected that Carnes was in 
fact doing business within the State of Utah, and that it was 
a substantial volume of business. (R387-674) The details of 
this conduct on the part of Carnes which Appellant contends 
subjects it to the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts will be 
more specifically developed in the Argument. 
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This statement comprises, we believe, an adequate presenta-
tion of the factual situation. If dd't· 1 a l lana facts appear 
necessary to any part of the argument, they will be set forth 
therein. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT CARNES HAS DONE BUSINESS 
IVITHIN THE STATE or UTAH \IHTHIN THE 
DEFINITION OF THE LONG ARM STATUTE 
OF UTAH AND THE SERVICE OF SUt1!·lONS 
ON CARNES VESTS THE UTAH COURT I'IITH 
JURISDICTION. 
At least since May 24, 1961, when Carnes Corporation of 
Verona, Wisconsin entered into a Sales Agreement with Ted R. 
Brown and Associates, it has been doing business within the 
State of Utah. (Rl45) The extensive activities within this 
State commenced with contracting with a sales representative 
to actively solicit sales of Carnes products in this State. 
(Rl45, 203, 600, and Ex lP) While the Sales Agreement pur-
ported to be providing for the services of the sales represen-
tative as independent contractors, it was uniformly testified 
by Ted R. Brown, Lynn Felton, Richard McDowell, and James A. 
Carlsen, that while Carnes did not maintain a place of business 
as such in the State of Utah, that the sales representative 
was given sales literature by Carnes upon which he was to 
place his name, address, and telephone number and distribute 
the same and actively let it be known that he was the represen-
tative of Carnes in the State of Utah. (R427,468, 497, 601,602) 
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Goods sold were shipped directly to the customer in Utah, 
freight allowed, all freight being paid by Carnes, billing 
was direct by Carnes to the customer. (R453, 451, 477) The 
goods were warranted and the warranty was in writing by Carnes 
direct to the customer. (R 443, 478-481) If there were any 
problems in respect to any materials supplied to Utah consumers, 
they complained to the Utah sales representative who usually 
re?resented Carnes in the handling of the matter unless, as in 
the case of the Church Office Building, Carnes elected to send 
personnel to handle the matter from the home office. (Rl33, 425-
432, 443-447' 468-481, 488, 489, 492-494, 502-506, 512-513) 
Carnes also had the Utah sales representative help in handling 
collection of bills owing from purchasers of the Carnes products, 
inc!udi~g the filing of liens in Utah by Carnes to collect for 
products sold here. (R509-510) Carnes did a substantial volume 
of business each year in the State of Utah. Sales through Long 
Deming Utah, Inc., the sales representative were, 1968 -$26,451; 
1969- $448,445; 1970- $82,433; 1971- $164,800; 1972- $127,338; 
1973- $126,212. The sales were estimated for 1974- $200,000; 
1975 - $175,000. These figures were supplied by Mr. Felton of 
Long Deming Utah, Inc. (R502) A review of the sum total of the 
testimony of the representatives of Carnes, including Mr. Weamer, 
a present Carnes official, leaves no doubt of the scope and 
extent of the conduct of business in Utah by this Company. 
(R401-675) The specific claim asserted by Ted R. Brown and 
Associates, Inc. in this action against Carnes and Long Deming 
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Utah, Inc. arose out of the contract and the actual supplying 
of Carnes product for the incorporation into the Church Office 
Building o: the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 
constructed in Salt Lake City, Utah between 1968 and 1972. 
(Rl60-163, 337-341) It was testified by Mr. Ted R. Brown 
that in the 1960's, upon learning of the Church Office Building 
construction project which was to be undertaken with Bishop 
George Cannon Young as Church architect, that he immediately 
commenced to negotiate to try and supply Carnes material for 
this job. The testimony of not only ~lr. Brown, but of Hr. 
Richard Young, member of the architectural firm of George 
Cannon Young; Mr. Quentin Tregeagle, the engineer for the pro-
ject; and of Mr. Felton of Long Deming Utah, Inc., gave this 
picture of the development and ultimate supplying of Carnes 
material to the Church Office Building job. After the initial 
contacts by Mr. Brown, as sales representative of Carnes, it 
was learned that Bishop Cannon Young, the architect, and Mr. 
Treseagle were collaborating to develop an idea for modular 
air bar ventilating equipment which was Mr. Young's idea. It 
required special equipment which had not been developed before. 
Bishop Cannon Young and Mr. Tregeagle were both concerned that 
they should get the services of a competent manufacturer and 
supplier of air conditioning equipment in order to be sure 
that the equipment which was necessary would function properly 
and would do the job in the building to be constructed. Ac-
cordingly, they requested that Mr. Brown arrange for Carnes to 
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make a "mock up" of the proposed product and it was testified 
that during the preliminary negotiations for this work, Mr. 
Tregeagle, at Carnes' expense, visited the Carnes factory in 
Verona, Wisconsin, and that he was shown by Carnes and their 
engineers the method by which they proposed to put this product 
into production and make the same available for the Church job. 
Ultimately an actual "mock up" of the product was developed, 
manufactured and sent to Utah with Mr. Watts, an engineer from 
the sales division of Carnes, and Mr. Watts and Ted Brown set 
up the "mock up" in a room at the Ambassador Club on Fifth 
East in Salt Lake City, Utah, where a demonstration of the pro-
duct was conducted for the benefit of Mr. Tregeagle and the 
benefit of Bishop George Cannon Young, the church architect. 
After ~je de~onstration and the assurances by the Carnes per-
sonnel directly to both Mr. Tregeagle and to Bishop Cannon 
Young, it was decided that the Carnes material would be utilized 
in the job and Richard Young testified that the architect 
thereupon, together with the collaboration of Mr. Tregeagle, 
wrote into the specifications a requirement for the Carnes 
material. Mr. Richard Young testified in this regard as follows: 
"Q And with what architectural firm are 
you associated? 
A George Cannon Young Associates. 
Q Was that firm the architect for the 
LDS Church Office Building in Salt 
Lake City? 
A Yes, it was. 
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Q And in your capacity in that archi-
tectural firm, did you have anything 
to do with the LOS Church Office 
Building plans or construction? 
A Yes, I was the project architect. 
Q As such were you acquainted with the 
material referred to generally in 
heating and air diffusing part of 
that construction known as Carnes 
material? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Do you know from what source that 
material was obtained? 
A It was first introduced by our 
mechanical engineer, Mr. Tregeagle, 
and he was represented also by Ted 
R. Brown. 
Q And was this material especially 
designed and constructed by Carnes 
for that job? 
A Yes, it was a special adaptation of 
--for an air bar. We had looked the 
market over and could not find the 
diffuser that would meet all of the 
requirements of our particular job. 
Q Now, was this air bar to which you 
refer something that your father 
designed with Mr. Tregeagle? 
A Yes, it was." 
" ... A At a later time that design was sent 
on to Carnes. They sent back shop 
drawin0s on the manufacture of it. 
And th~n in 1964 the associated mechani-
cal engineer, Frank Bridgers, addressed 
a letter to Carnes in care of Mr. Kenneth 
Watts asking that assembly be tested in 
their testing facility in Verona, Wiscon-
sin. And he makes mention in his letter 
that the mockup had been reviewed here 
in Salt Lake, and several questions had 
been raised about short circuiting of 
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of the air supply in the air return 
system. 
Q What is the mockup you referred to, 
Mr. Young? 
A The mockup was sent out by Carnes. 
It was an actual physical sample of 
the assembly. It was set up in the 
Ambassador Club as was mentioned. 
Q Did you see it there? 
A Yes, I saw it there." 
" ... A In our specification. In fact on the 
air bar assembly since we had worked 
with them exclusively we made it a 
proprietary item then by addendum at 
the request of the owner and included 
one other manufacturer as being accep-
table to supply that item. 
Q So that actually, then, by your speci-
fication you almose mandated that the 
item be purchased from Carnes? 
A ~es, if you'd like me to read that 
section of the specifications-- ... " 
" ... The air bar ceiling distribution system 
shall be as manufactured by Carnes Cor-
poration or ap2roved equal." (R524-527) 
Mr. Young further testified that there was difficulty with the 
product once it had been installed, that it did not work pro-
perly. (R527) Mr. Tregeagle similarly testified and that at 
least two engineers visited the job from Carnes Corporation in 
an effort to solve problems arising from the installation of 
this product in the job. They were Norman Rick, an officer in 
the sales end of the corporation, and Duaine Shackelford, the 
project engineer or one of the chief engineers for the Company. 
(RSSO) Corroborative of the testimony of both Mr. Brown, Mr. 
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Tregeagle and Mr. Young are the Exhibits which were introduced 
and received by the Court. (Exhibits 8P through 25P) The sales 
figures previously set forth for the year 1969 and 1970, 
principal years of construction during which the Carnes material 
was supplied to the Church Office Building, reflect that in 
1969 the sales in Utah were $428,445 and in 1970 - 582,433. 
(R502) 
Under the Sales Representative Agreement which Ted R. Brown 
and Associates, Inc. had with Carnes, upon the consummation of 
the sale and the placement of the materials into the Church 
Office Building, Brown became entitled to a commission for his 
sales effort. (Rl45-154, 149 and 442) This was recognized ac-
cording to the testimony of Mr. Brown who referred to a letter 
he had received from Dan Deviser, an officer of Carnes. How-
ever, Carnes terminated the Sales Representative Agreement with 
Brown and entered into a new Sales Representative Agreement 
with Long Deming Utah, Inc. (R442) Mr. Brown never did receive 
the commission. (R442) This action was brought to recover the 
commission 'and damages for what is alleged to be the collusive 
action of Carnes and Long Deming Utah, Inc. to deprive Brown of 
its commission. (Rl60-163, R337-341) 
The Long Arm Statute of the State of Utah at 78-27-24 UCA 
1953, as amended, reads as follows: 
"78-27-24. Jurisdiction over non-
residents - Acts submitting person to 
jurisdiction. - Any person, notwith-
standing section 16-10-102, whether or 
not a citizen or resident of this State, 
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who in person or through an agent does 
any of the following enumerated acts, 
submits himself, and if an individual, 
his personal representative, to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this 
State as to any claim arising from: 
"(1) The transaction of any business 
within this state; 
"(2) Contracting to supply services 
or goods in this state; 
It is the contention of Appellant that the record clearly shows 
that Carnes Corporation did transact business within this State 
and did contract to supply service or goods in this State and 
that the claim of Ted R. Brown and Associates for the commission 
arose out of this action of Carnes. 
It is interesting to note that consistently in the presen-
tation of this matter to the Court below, the attorney for 
Carnes ~as taken the position that if the L.D.S. Church was to 
commence an action against Carnes, it could secure jurisdiction 
over Carnes under the Long Arm Statute, but that the claim of 
Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc. does not arise out of the 
transaction of business in the State of Utah by Carnes and that 
therefore, Ted R. Brown and Associates could not substantiate 
service under the Statute upon Carnes. We quote from the state-
ment made by Mr. Moyle to Judge Leary at the commencement of 
this proceeding before Judge Leary: 
"But I want to return to a discussion 
of the Long Arm Statute and what--the way 
that was argued to Judge Hall because it 
puts the case in its perspective, and because 
it will affect materially the type of evidence 
that's presented here today. 
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"The jurisdiction allocation and com-
plaint in the plaintiff's complaint is 
Section 78-27-24(2). Now, that says that 
the court has jurisdiction over a party 
contracting to supply services or goods in 
this State. 
"Now, if we move on to Section 26 of the 
Long Arm Statute, that section provides, and 
I quote, 
Only claims arising from acts enume-
rated herein may be asserted against 
a defendant in an action in which 
jurisdiction over him is based upon 
this act. 
Now, the question that was ?resented to Judge 
Hall, and the question that will be presented 
to Your Honor today, is: Is the plaintiff's 
suit against Carnes one that arises from acts 
enumerated "herein", specifically the juris-
dictional allegations that this is a suit 
arising out of a contract to supply services 
or goods in this state. 
"And I present to Your Honor that that is 
not so. The suit is for breach of contract ... " 
(R421) 
Mr. Moyle later even offered to Stipulate, though the offer was 
withdrawn: 
"MR. MOYLE: We would be willing to 
stipulate Your Honor, that the business 
conducted by Carnes which results in the 
importation of goods into the state of Utah 
is such that in this instance, had suit been 
brought by the purchaser of the goods manu-
factured and supplied by Carnes, to-wit the 
owners of the LDS Church Office Building, 
that there would have been sufficient nexus 
to give this court jurisdiction over that 
suit. " (R435) 
Mr. Moyle, subsequently backed away from the stipulation stating: 
"I think I'll back off on that. We 
conceded arguendo in the entire argument 
before Hall, but there we didn't have live 
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witnesses. I was doing it to avoid 
the necessity of the~. I think since we 
have live witnesses we'd better let the 
facts show what the facts show and I'll 
withdraw the proffer." ( R4 3 6) 
It should be noted, however, that while backing away from the 
stipulation, Mr. Moyle continued the admission that this was 
the basis of his position taken before Judge Hall. He did not 
at any time offer any other position in regard to his resis-
tance to the jurisdiction under the Long Arm Statute save and 
except that he attempted to raise a problem based on the con-
tention that the plaintiff's Complaint limited the claim of 
jurisdiction under the Long Arm Statute to sub paragraph (2) 
of 78-27-24 (Contracting to supply services or goods in this 
State), and was not broad enough to permit it to avail itself 
of the transaction 0f any business within this State, sub 
paragrapt (:1. Nhile counsel for Brown did not agree with 
the interpretation placed upon the language embodied in the 
Complaint: 
"3. Jurisdiction of the Court over Carnes 
Corporation is based on Section 78-27-24 
(2) and related provisions of the Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended." (Emphasis 
ours) 
Counsel nevertheless asked leave of Court to file an amended 
complaint to eliminate any possibility of confusion in regard 
thereto and the Court granted this permission. The verbal 
order of the Court permitting amendment was reduced to writing 
(R335-336), and the amended Complaint was in fact filed. (R337-
341) 
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It is respectfully submitted to the Court that even under 
the more restricted interpretation of the Long Arm Statute 
adopted by this Court up to the recent case of Abbott G. M. 
Die~e~,_J~~- vs. Piper Aircraft Corporation, filed April 
14th, 1978, 578 P2d 850 , the argument contended fc~ by 
Mr. Moyle could not be supported. The Zales Jewelry case, 
Hill vs. Zale Corporation, decided March 9, 1971, 25 U2d 357, 
482 P2d 332, involved a matter wherein Hill, the plaintiff, 
sought to enforce against Zale Corporation, a Texas corporation, 
a claim for his wages and an incentive award, vacation pay, 
and moving expenses, which he claimed to be due to him for 
services which he rendered to the defendant at Anchorage, Alaska. 
The transaction of business in the State of Utah by Zale Cor-
poration had nothing whatever to do with Mr. Hill's claim and 
the Utah Supreme Court found that the minimal contacts required 
in Utah had been maintained by Zale and allowed Hill to bring 
the action in the State of Utah. We also point out that the 
International Shoe C5se decided by the United States Supreme 
Court, 326 US 310, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, did not in 
any manner involve a claim by a customer of the shoe company 
but involved the effort by the State of Washington to collect 
taxes based upon the fact that the International Shoe Company 
had been doing business within the State of Washington. We 
urge upon this Court that the Appellant Brown is asserting a 
claim for a commission arising directly out of the sale of mer-
chandise to a Utah customer, to-wit: The Church of Jesus Christ 
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of Latter Day Saints, is not as remote from the transaction of 
business within the State of Utah as either Mr. Hill in the 
Zale case or the State of Washington in the International Shoe 
case. Under the doctrine ennunciated by the Court in the 
Abbott G~ case vs. Piper Aircraft Corporation, supra the 
activities of Carnes within the State of Utah establish beyond 
any question of a doubt its presence here for all purposes. 
We respectfully submit that the service of Summons on Carnes 
accomplished on either or both occasions under the Long Arm 
Statute would be sufficient to permit Ted R. Brown and As-
sociates, Inc. to proceed in the Courts of the State of Utah 
agai~st this defendant to permit the Utah Courts to try the 
action based on Brown's claim of a commission due for sale of 
Carnes pradJcts utilized in the construction of the L.D.S. 
Church Office Building located in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
POINT II 
SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON OFFICERS OF LONG 
DEMING UTAH, INC. AND UTEMP-UTAH AIR 
SALES, CARNES' EXCLUSIVE SALES REPRE-
SENTATIVES IN UTAH, WAS GOOD SERVICE 
OF SU~10NS ON CARNES CORPORATION UNDER 
THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 4(e) (4) URCP. 
In Point I of this brief some factual information has 
been presented concerning the activities of Long Deming Utah, 
Inc. and of Utemp-Utah Air Sales in their capacity as the 
contractual sales representatives acting in the State of Utah 
for Carnes. Without reiterating all of that information under 
this Point, we refer the Court again to those factual disclo-
sures. 
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The evidence showed that Long Deming Utah, Inc. entered 
into a contract with Carnes Corporation to act as its exclusive 
sales representative in the State of Utah. This contract, 
dated September 3, 1968, was in full force and effect from that 
date in 1968 through the year 1973. (R20l-218) Clause 13 of 
the contract, found at R217, specifically defines the obliga-
tion of the distributor or representative to cooperate fully 
and promptly with Carnes in the sale of products covered by 
the Agreement. We quote the provision. 
"13. Cooperation of Distributor or Repre-
sentative with Carnes 
The distributor or representative agrees 
at all times to cooperate fully and promptly 
with Carnes in the sale of all products 
covered in this agreement, and to render 
such information and reports as and when 
such information is requested, and to 
furnish to Carnes copies of all corres-
pondence, quotations, and invoices, covering 
the products covered by this agreement, when 
such information is specifically requested 
by Carnes." 
Mr. Ted R. Brown, who acted under a similar Sales Agree-
ment, testified as to the wide range of activities that he con-
ducted for Carnes in the State of Utah as its representative, 
including the setting up of the "mock up" participated in by 
Mr. Watts of the air bar construction to be manufactured by 
Carnes for the Church Office Building. (R568-569, 577, Exhibit 
22P and 23P) He related activities he had undertaken for Carnes 
in handling credit and collection problems substantiated by 
Exhibits 2 and 3, and handling of damaged shipments. (R532, 
Exhibit 4). All disclose the active conduct of business in 
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the State of Utah by Ted R. Brown for Carnes. !'lr. Felton of 
Long Deming Utah, Inc. was specific in the duties which he 
performed. He also stated that Carnes frequently sent repre-
sentatives from the horne office into the State of Utah to dis-
cuss with Long Deming personnel their sales records, their 
performance, new products, and introduction of new products. 
(R503) He admitted that Carnes made suggestions as to things 
which Carnes could supply and the manufacturing processes they 
could provide. He admitted that he handled warrantys and claims 
under warrantys for Carnes, acting as an employee of Long 
Deming Utah, Inc., the sales representative of Carnes. He 
specifically referred to a given paragraph of the Sales Repre-
sentative Agreement which he felt governed Long Deming's 
activities in that regard. (RSOS) He was asked: 
"Q Aid as the exclusive representative, 
d:~ you deem that it was necessary 
fer you to undertake and act as the 
intermediary as you describe in the 
warranty claims? 
A That's correct." 
In regard to the dissemination of the Carnes catalogue and 
sales at R507: 
"Q So that in some manner you dissemi-
nated the knowledge to people of this 
State if they wanted to buy Carnes 
material, Long Deming is the place to 
get it, is that correct? 
A That's right. 
Q How would that be done? 
A We published a listing of all of the 
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manufacturers represented by us and 
distributed to appropriate contractors, 
architects, engineer, that might con-
stitute a market for our products. 
Q Did that give your office address and 
your telephone number and where you 
could be reached? 
A Yes." 
At page 509 of the record, Mr. Felton of Long Deming Utah, Inc. 
was asked: 
"Q Now, did you ever have anything to do 
with the collection of any of the 
amounts that were due for Carnes 
material? 
A Yes. 
Q What did you do? 
A Larger projects. The Carnes Corpora-
tion have often asked us to provide 
them with various job information 
including such things as the names of 
all of the parties that were party to 
the contract - That is, the owner, the 
general contractor, the mechanical con-
tractor, the sheet metal contractor, so 
forth - whether or not the job was a 
public or private job, whether or not 
the job was bonded, the name of the 
bonding company, the address of the 
bonding company, all of the information 
necessary for Carnes to protect its 
interest in the job, its equipment. 
Q Now, suppose that they didn't pay? Did 
you ever take any action to try and col-
lect such an account? 
A During the course of our representation 
for Carnes, we assisted them in collec-
tion efforts from time to time. 
Q Did you ever file a lien against a job? 
A We were not--we could not file a lier 
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for them, but we helped them in ob-
taining legal descriptions and so forth, 
details for them to file the lien. 
Q Did they ever file a lien to your know-
ledge in this State? 
A My memory is a little bit hazy, but I am 
quite sure that they did. I remember 
Carnes being involved in a lien, but I 
couldn't provide any more details than 
that." (R510) 
With respect to the Church Office job, Mr. Pelton testified 
that when trouble developed, he worked with the representatives 
from Carnes in solving the problem and that Carnes sent out 
Norm Rick, a products manager and that they sent an engineer 
whose name he could not recall. Mr. Felton was asked: 
"Q And did you continue to pursue this on 
behalf of Carnes as their representative 
in the State of Utah to try and effect 
a correction of this trouble? 
A Yes. 
Q And did Carnes on several occasions 
before it was finally concluded, send 
representatives out to work on this 
problem? 
A Yes." (R513) 
Mr. Carlsen of Utemp-Utah Air Sales testified that Utemp-Air 
Sales was working as the representative for Carnes in the State 
of Utah under an agreement dated September 16, 1975, which was 
replaced by a new agreement April 22, 1977. The agreement is 
made an Exhibit in the file. (Exhibit lD, R493) Mr. Carlsen 
outlined similar activities conducted by Utemp-Utah Air Sales 
as did Mr. McDowell of that company, in their respective testi-
monies to those referred to in the record under the testimony 
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given by Mr. Felton and Mr. Ted R. Brown. There is thus a 
long period of time in which Carnes has had the benefit of 
doing business within the State of Utah through the activities 
of its sales representative. 
Appellant maintains that Service of Summons upon the duly 
authorized officer of Long Deming Utah, Inc. and subsequently 
Utemp-Utah Air Sales constituted a good and sufficient service 
under the provisions of Rule 4(e) (4) URCP, which provides: 
"(4) Upon any corporation, not herein 
otherwise provided for, upon a partnership 
or other unincorporated association which 
is subject to suit under a common naMe, by 
delivering a copy t~ereof to an officer, a 
managing or general agent, or to any other 
agent authorized by appointment or by law 
to receive service of process and, if the 
agent is one authorized by statute to 
receive service and the statute so requires, 
by also mailing a copy to the defendant. 
If no such officer or agent can be found 
in the county in which the action is brought, 
then upon any such officer or agent, or any 
clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief clerk, 
or other agent having the ~anagement, direc-
tion or control of any property of such 
corporation, partnership or other unin-
corporated association within the state. 
If no such officer or agent can be found 
in the state, and the defendant has, or 
advertises or holds itself out as having, 
an office or place of business in this 
state, or does business in this state, 
then upon the person doing such business 
or in charge of such office cr place of 
business." 
Increasingly, it is being recognized that a corporation 
can do business in a State through an independent contractor 
and that the fact that such business is done through an indepen-
dent contractor does not, in any manner, protect the foreign 
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corporation from process within the State in which it does 
business through such a contractor. We quote Fletcher's 
Cyclopedia of Corporations (Perm Ed) Volume 18, revised 1977, 
Section 8724, as follows, to-wit: 
"8724. -Contracts and transactions through 
resident agent, representative or indepen-
dent contractor. 
"Even before the International Shoe case, 
it was universally held that it was not 
essential to jurisdiction in personam over 
a foreign corporation that it be physically 
present within the state, but it is suffi-
cient if it exists in the state of its 
domicile, and acts by agent in the state 
assuming jurisdiction. And the fact that 
the foreign corporation's agent in the 
state is a corporation is not material. 
Thus where a foreign corporation maintains 
a stock of goods on the premises of, and 
in the charge of, a domestic warehouse 
company, and furnishes such company a 
credit list authorizing it to allow 
certal~ customers to withdraw goods on 
thelr own written orders, and the company 
notifles the foreign corporation of the 
details of its delivery of goods to custo-
mers, and the customers are billed directly 
from the home office of the foreign corp-
oration, the warehouse company is agent 
of the foreign corporation, and its 
activities on its behalf constitute 
doing business in the state by the cor-
poration, and service of process on the 
warehouse company is service on the 
corporation, and this is so though the 
warehouse company functions in a similar 
way for others and disclaims the agency. 
"And where a foreign insurance company 
empowers a domestic corporation to adjust 
losses for it, and letters written by the 
company refer to the domestic corporation 
as its representative, and correspondence 
between the two corporations also evidences 
the existence of an agency, the foreign 
company is doing business in the state 
-34-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
through the agency of the domestic 
corporation, and service of summons 
upon the latter is valid service on 
such company. 
"But it is equally well settled that 
the mere presence or "doing business" 
will not suffice to confer jurisdiction 
in personam over the defendant foreign 
corporation. 
"The recent trend is that a foreign 
corporation is not immunized from service 
of process merely because it operates 
through an independent contractor. While 
it is essential under due process that 
there be a showing that the foreign cor-
poration purposefully availed itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum state, it is recognized 
that such activities may be carried on bv 
an independent agent or manufacturer's -
representative. In addition the mere fact 
that the agent works for several principals 
should not be necessarily determinative of 
the question. Thus, in a decision following 
the International Shoe doctrine, a foreign 
magazine publisher was held subject to 
service of process for an alleged libel 
where all the printing and distribution 
was done in the forum, though by a domes-
tic independent contractor." 
If a foreign corporation not qualified to do business in 
the State of Utah can contract to have services performed to 
enable it to do business as Carnes did, in active competition 
with Utah residents and merchants in the manner testified to 
by Mr. Brown, Mr. Felton, Mr. Carlsen, and Mr. McDowell, it is 
neither unfair nor unjust to also vest that representative with 
the capacity under the law to accept service of Summons for 
that corporation and to base jurisdiction of the foreign corpor-
ation in Utah Courts on such service. We submit that the 
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service upon Mr. Felton, asan officer of Long Demlng Utah, Inc. 
while that corporation was acting under written sales agree-
ment as the representative of Carnes in the State of Utah, and 
the subsequent service upon Mr. Richard Bartlett McDowell, an 
officer of Utemp-Utah Air Sales while that company was acting 
as a representative under a written agreement with Carnes, 
constitute good and sufficient service on Carnes and should 
subject that corporation to the jurisdiction of the Utah Courts. 
POINT III 
THE DECISIONS AND ORDERS OF JUDGS HALL AND 
OF JUDGE LEARY QUASHING SERVICE OF SUMMONS 
ON CARNES, FOR WHATEVER REASOc-JS, ARE Dl 
ERROR AND SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
As has been previously explained in the Statement of Facts 
and under Points I and II, this matter first came on before 
Judge Gorjo~ ?. Hall on Carnes' Motion to Quash Service of 
Summons and Dismiss. (Rl39, 124) The matter had been noticed 
up before the La\v and Motion Division of the Court. (Rl24) It 
was submitted to the Court on the basis of the Complaint as 
filed (Rl60-165) and the Affidavit of Mr. Ted R. Brown, Presi-
dent of Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc. (Rl33-l34) The affi-
davit of Nichols admitted the validity of the Sales Agreement 
entered into by Carnes with Ted R. Brown for services to be 
performed by Brown for Carnes in the State of Utah, a copy of 
which had been filed with the Complaint marked Exhibit "A". 
(Rl60-163) (Apparently through oversight the exhibit was net 
attached to the Complaint. On November 20, 1973, counsel 
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having learned of this error, immediately filed the exhibit 
"A" and served COflies on counsel for Carnes and Long Demins 
Utah, Inc.) (Rl44-l54) tlr. Nichols' affidavit also admi tteci 
that plaintiff, Ted R. Bro1m and Associates, did act as a sales 
representative for Carnes, soliciting orders from contractors 
in Utah and transmitting such orders to Carnes and that all 
such orders received by Carnes, including the orders for the 
Church Office Building involved in this case, were shipped 
directly by Carnes to the ultimate purchaser in Utah and that 
payments therefore were made directly to Carnes by the purchaser. 
(Rl36, par. 5) Mr. Brown's affidavit stated that between May 
24, 1961, and August 29, 1968, Ted R. Brown and Associates, 
Inc., had been the authorized distributor or representative of 
Carnes in Utah and that to his knowledge Carnes had contracted 
to supply goods, wares and merchandise to buyers within the 
State of Utah on many occasions and that the goods, wares and 
merchandise were warranted to the buyers as expressed on Carnes 
Corporation's acknowledgment of order issued to such buyers. 
His affidavit stated that pursuant to such contracts, Carnes 
had supplied goods to persons in this State and had paid to 
Brown a commission based on the sales in accordance with the 
agreement which Carnes had for Brown's services. The affidavit 
stated that: 
"the sale and delivery of the goods that 
gave rise to the present claim was consum-
mated in the State of Utah and said goods 
were, in fact delivered to and incorporated 
into the LDS Church Office Building in Salt 
Lake City." (Rl34, par. 3) 
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These admissions by Nichols and by Brown were not traversed. 
The hearing was scheduled on October lst, 1974. In the after-
noon of September 27, 1974, counsel for Brown was served Wlth 
a Memorandum in Support of Defendant Carnes Corporation's 
Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss, prepared by counsel for 
Carnes. (Rl25-l32) The 27th day of September was a Friday. 
Counsel for Brown had no opportunity to prepare any responsive 
memorandum for the Court before hearing on Tuesday, October lst. 
At the oral argument in Court, Mr. Moyle acting for Carnes, 
laid most of his emphasis upon the contention that the claim 
asserted by Brown did not come within the purview of the Long 
Arm Statute and that therefore the jurisdiction over Carnes 
must fail. (R435-436) However, he extensively argued also his 
contentl8n t~at the minimal contacts required under the doctrine 
enunciated by the Supreme Court of Utah in the Hill vs. Zale 
Corporation case, 25 U2d 357; 482 P2d 332, were not met. (Rl251 
To counsel for the Appellant Brown, the affidavits of Nichols 
and Brown seemed to establish the fact that Carnes was indeed 
contracting to and in fact supplying goods in the State of Utah. 
The question of whether Brown was in fact asserting a claim 
based upon the enumerated acts mentioned in the Long Arm Statute 
seemed apparent on its face, since the claim was for commissions 
based on sales of Carnes material to the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter Day Saints to be incorporated in the Church Office 
Building. The fact that a claim for damages and collusion be-
tween Carnes and Long Deming Utah, Inc., in depriving Brown of 
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the commission was alleged in the Complaint certainly did not 
appear to be any basis upon which jurisdiction under the Long 
Arm Statute could be denied. No mention in the Memorandum 
submitted by Carnes or in oral argument was specifically made 
by Counsel for Carnes or Brown about the service of summons 
which had been made on Long Deming Utah, Inc., as the sales 
representative for Carnes under Rule 4 (e) (4} URCP. 
\"/hen Judge Hall entered his Order entitled "JC'DG)IItENT" 
after having taken the matter under advisement, he gave no 
clue as to the basis upon which he was granting the motion of 
the defendant Carnes. (Rl2l-122} He not only quashed the 
Service of Summons but he dismissed the claims. (Rll7} That 
he could not dismiss the plaintiff's claim was clear. Counsel 
for Brown believed that the entire Order was in error. The 
portion wherein the Court dismissed the claims ignored the 
fact that Long Deming had been validly served with Summons as 
a party defendant and had duly answered the Complaint, and no 
request had been made on its part for dismissal. (Rl4l-143) 
A motion was filed on behalf of Brown asking the Court to 
reconsider its action or vacate or amend the Judgment. As set 
forth before, it had been learned that apparently, funds still 
remained due to Carnes from the Church or its general contractor 
and accordingly, counsel did not immediately call up for argu-
ment its motion for reconsideration but proceeded with an 
attac~ent. As more particularly set forth in the Statement of 
Facts herein, (pg. 9 to 12} this resulted in considerable delay. 
rarnes had counsel file a Motion for Release of the Attachment. 
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Counsel for Carnes called up both that Motion and the previ-
ously filed Motion of Brown for Reconsideration of Judge Hall's 
Judgment for hearing. (R93-96) This matter was heard by Judge 
Hall who refused to consider the matter of the Release of 
Attachment stating it should be heard by the Judge who granted 
the attachment. He amended his previous Judgment by striking 
the portion which related to the dismissal of claims. He 
denied the request for reconsideration of the Motion to Quash. 
(R74-75) Counsel for Brown had specifically asked Judge Hall 
to allow an opportunity to present evidence on the matter of 
the JUrisdiction under the Long Arm Statute and on the matter 
of the validity of the service on the sales representative of 
Carnes, Long Deming Utah, Inc., but Judge Hall declined to 
reco~s~dec the matter and would not grant such a hearing. 
(R74-75i Again Judge Hall gave no clue as to what had moti-
vated his decision. Whether he considered the matter of 
minimal contacts of compelling importance, or whether he 
acceded to the argument of Mr. Moyle on the fact that Brown 
could not claim the benefit for the Long Arm Statute was not 
disclosed. Counsel for Brown knew that the factual situation 
with regard to the activities of Carnes in the State of Utah 
could be clarified if a hearing could be obtained at which 
evidence could be presented and witnesses examined. This 
could not be done on the Law and Motion calendar. The problem 
confronting counsel for Brown was whether to immediately appeal 
Judge Hall's decision, which counsel considered erroneous on 
the existing state of the record, or whether it would be 
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better to try to get a hearing at which the facts could be 
adduced in regard to Carnes' activities in Utah. The election 
was made to preserve the right to appeal from Judge Hall's 
decision by filing a Notice of Intention to Appeal under 
72(a) URCP, and proceed with the hearing on the Motion for 
Release of Attachment which posed a possible alternative method 
oE obtaining jurisdiction. It appeared to counsel that in 
moving for a release of attachment when no propert:• had been 
successfully attached and in asking that the Court consider 
the Constitutionality of the Utah Attachment procedure, went 
far beyond the scope of a special appearance and constituted a 
general appearance by counsel for Carnes. (Rl02) Accordingly, 
counsel filed a Motion to have the Court declare that Carnes 
had entered a general appearance and directing that it respond 
to the Complaint or be found in default. (R72-73) Carnes' 
Hotion for Release of Attachment and Brown's Motion for 
Declaration of General Appearance by Carnes were both noticed 
up for hearing before Judge Hanson. (R68-69) Judge Hanson 
released the attachment but found that Carnes had entered a 
general appearance and ordered that it suitably plead within 
ten days. (R65) Carnes immediately petitioned for an Inter-
locutory Appeal to this Court. Appellant in a separate Peti-
tion, asked that this Court grant an Interlocutory Appeal from 
Judge Hall's decision. This Petition was not acted on by the 
Court which simply refunded the petitioner's fee. The Inter-
locutory Appeal was granted to Carnes. (Docket No. 14057 in 
t~e Supreme Court) This Court held that Carnes had not 
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entered a general appearance. Accordingly, counsel was still 
left with the problem of getting the facts concerning Carnes' 
activities in Utah more fully developed through having an 
evidentiary hearing before the Court. A try at an unprece-
dented procedure based on a Motion to Declare Service of 
Summons Sufficient, heard by Judge Taylor, died aborning, for 
the Judge refused to set any hearing for the taking o~ evi-
dence say~ng that he could find no basis in the rules for such 
a procedure. (R224) 
Rule 4(b) URCP specifically provides that Summons can be 
served on a party at any time before trial if one party to 
the action has been served. Counsel therefor decided to re-
serve Summons on Carnes which was done by service personally 
by tr.e Sher~ff of Wisconsin on a designated process agent, and 
in Utah ny serving an officer of Utemp-Utah Air Sales, the 
sales representative in Utah under contract with Carnes. (R229-
230, 234-235) Counsel for Carnes promptly filed a Motion to 
Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction. (R232) Instead of 
noticing up that Motion for hearing before the Law and Motion 
Division of the Court, counsel for Brown filed a Motion asking 
that a special hearing be set at which witnesses could be 
produced and evidence presented on the matter of Carnes' 
activities in Utah, as a basis for resisting the Motion to 
Dismiss and to Quash. (R237) This Motion of Brown was heard 
by Judge David Dee. An imposing memorandum of authorities 
filed by counsel for Bro>m, and a reply thereto by counsel 
for Carnes. The Court permitted a long oral argument. Among 
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the contentions made by Carnes in support of its position that 
no special hearing should be granted was a claim that the 
entire matter of jurisdiction over Carnes was res judicata 
by virtue of the previous Order of Judge Hall. This position 
was argued extensively orally and in the memoranda to Judge 
Dee. (R2 55-2 57, 28 3-292) Judge Dee granted the hearing as 
requested by Brown, (R304) and overruled objections thereto 
filed by Carnes. (R302) Carnes promptly filed a petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal. This petition was based primarily on 
the claim that the Order of Judge Hall made the jurisdictional 
matter res judicata. This Court denied the Petition for Inter-
locutory Appeal and allowed the special hearing to go forward. 
(Docket No. 15564, R320) 
It should be recognized that this Court has made known the 
purpose of an Interlocutory Appeal in opinions handed down over 
the years. One of the leading authorities is the case of 
Manwill vs. Oyler, 11 U2d 433, 361 P2d 177. In that case the 
Court states: 
"(1) The purpose to be served in grant-
ing an interlocutory appeal is to get direclty 
at and dispose of the issues as quickly as 
possible consistent with thoroughness and 
efficiency in the administration of justice. 
But that objective is not always served by 
granting such an appeal. In some instances, 
the necessity of remanding for trial may 
result in protracting rather than shorten-
ing the litigation. For this reason, when-
ever it appears likely that the matter in 
dispute can be finally disposed of upon a 
trial; or where they may become moot; or 
where they can, without involving any 
serious difficulty, abide determination in 
the event of an appeal after the trial, the 
desired objective is best served by refuslng 
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to entertain an interlocutory appeal 
and letting the case proceed to trial. 
Then, if an appeal is necessary, there is 
this additional advantage: the issues of 
facts have been determined and the record 
is viewed in the light most favorable to the 
judgment, instead of the reverse. 
"(2) On the other hand, the desired ob-
jective of efficiency in procedure can be pro-
moted, and the interlocutory appeal is prop-
erly granted, if it appears essential to adju-
dicate principles of law or procedure in ad-
vance as a necessary foundation upon which 
the tr~al may proceed; or ~f there is a h~gh 
likelihood that the litigation can be finally 
disposed of on such an appeal." (Emphasis ours) 
Since in the instant case, if the contention of the counsel 
for Carnes that Judge Hall's decision made the matter of juris-
diction res judicata was upheld on interlocutor~ appeal, it 
would dispose of the litigation, it apparently meant this 
Court did not agree with counsel's position and upheld Judge 
Dee's Qrder, and that Brown was entitled to an evidentiary 
heJc.~= :or the purpose of developing the facts necessary to a 
proper consideration of the jurisdictional question. That 
interpretation of this Court's action on the Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal is entirely consistent with the position 
taken in other doing business within the State of Utah and 
Long Arm Statute cases wherein the Court has held: 
"The question here, that of whether a non-
resident is doing business in the State is 
strictly a factual one, and each case, 
therefore, must be determined on its own 
peculiar and significant facts to determine 
if the local forum has jurisdiction to try 
and adjudge the claims or obligations of 
one domiciled elsewhere." Foreign Studv 
League vs. Holland-America Line, 27 U2d 
442, 497 P2d 244 at 244. 
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It is also consistent with the viewpoint that has been 
expressed by not only this Court but by the Supreme court of 
the United States in the International Shoe Co. vs. Washington 
case, 326 US310, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, and cited with 
approval by this Court in Hill vs. Zale, Supra: 
" ... due process requires only that in order 
to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain 
minimum contacts with it such that main-
tenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice.'" 482 P2d 332 at 334. 
We submit that traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice can hardly be violated by requiring that Carnes 
respond to Summons before the Courts of the State of Utah in 
the face of the involvement of that company in the sale of goods 
and products in this State to residents of this State, and in 
particular, the designing, manufacturing, providing, warranting, 
and collecting some $450,000.00 for materials incorporated into 
the Church Office Building job. 
We believe in refusing to grant the Interlocutory Appeal, 
this Court may have also considered that Judge Hall's Order, 
as contended by Brown, was contrary to law. Counsel for Carnes 
admitted in argument before Judge Hall that if the L.D.S. Church 
were to commence an action against Carnes, it could secure 
jurisdiction over Carnes under the Long Arm Statute. (R435-436) 
This constituted an admission of the minimal contacts in this 
State and the fact of having supplied goods and services and 
having transacted business within the State, sufficient to 
satisfy the jurisdictional requirements established by this 
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court. The only point then left for consideration by Judge 
Hall was the novel argument that Brown did not qualif:/ as one 
entitled to claim the benefits of the Long Arm Statute because 
Carnes contended that Brown's claim did not arise from acts 
en•.ll'llerated in the Statute. (R422) How a claim could more dir-
ectly arise from the acts of the defendant Carnes enumerated 
under the act than Brown's claim is difficult to conceive. 
Brown's claim arises out of the sale and delivery of goods by 
Carnes to the L.D.S. Church for incorporation into the Church 
Office Building, for the sale of which Carnes owes Brown a 
commission. In the Zale case, Mr. Hill, the plaintiff, sought 
to enforce a wage claim for services rendered in Alaska, and 
he chose as hls forum the State of Utah. This Court in that 
case stated that the extent to which the alleged facts of the 
assertec clalm arose from activities within the State was only 
one of ~ne factors to be considered in determining whether 
jurisdiction could be established in Utah. Even though Hill 
did not serve Zale in Utah, the Supreme Court found no in-
justice in granting jurisdiction over the corporation to en-
force the wage claim for services performed in Alaska. This 
Court in the Foreign Study League vs. Holland-America Line, 
27 U2d 442, 497 P2d 244, found even more tenuous contacts with 
Utah residents sufficient to support a law suit in thls State 
against the Holland-America Line. In that case, nothing was 
delivered into the State. Sales of cruises on the ships of 
this line were solicited by sales agents who receJ.ved a com-
mission for making such sales. The Line d1d noth1ng in thls 
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State save make a combined social and business call on an 
"agent" in this State. We respectfully submit that reviewed 
in the light of these standards, Judge Hall's decision was 
clearly wrong. 
In considering the action taken by Judge Leary, it should 
be born in mind that at the start of the hearing before Judge 
Leary, he was informed of the fact that the Order under which 
he was acting, issued by Judge Dee, had been the subject matter 
of a Petition of Interlocutory Appeal, and that the Appeal had 
been denied by this Court. Despite the mandate given by Judge 
Dee's Order, and the fact that the Supreme Court did not, when 
it clearly could have done so, stop the hearing under Judge 
Dee's Order by granting the Interlocutory Appeal, Judge Leary 
nevertheless failed to make a decision based upon the factual 
situation presented before him and instead grounded his Order 
upon his view of the matter which is clearly shown by the 
Memorandum Decision which he entered, and which, among other 
things provided: 
"1. That plaintiff had a right to pre-
sent evidence in opposition to defendant 
Carnes' Motion to Quash Service and Dismiss 
which came on for hearing before Judge Hall 
October l, 1974. 
"2. That plaintiff had an opportunity 
from the date of the filing of the complaint 
(October 26, 1973) until the hearing on def-
endant Carnes' Motion to Quash Service and 
Dismiss (October l, 1974) within which to 
conduct discovery for the purpose of ob-
taining evidence as to Carnes coming within 
the provisions of long arm statute and as 
to Long Deming Utah, Inc. being the agent 
of Carnes for the service of process. 
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"3. That substantially all of the 
evidence presented before this Court was 
peculiarly within the knowledge of plaintiff, 
was obtainable by interrogation of the wit-
nesses Young and Tregeagle, or by discovery 
prior to the hearing before Judge Hall on 
October 1, 1974. 
"4. That plaintiff commenced no dis-
covery until January 8, 1975. 
"5. That the testimony of the witnesses 
McDowell and Carlsen of Utemp, Inc. was 
cumulative. 
"6. That the service upon defendant 
Carnes Corporation by leaving with Lynn 
Felton and the service upon defendant Carnes 
Corporation by leaving with Richard McDowell 
were identical in the sense that at the time 
of service each was an officer of the then 
Sales Representative of Carnes Corporation 
in the State of Utah. 
"7. That the motions to strike 
made during the course of the hearing 
by defendant Carnes should be denied. 
"8. That Service of Summons upon 
defendant Carnes should be quashed but 
the Amended Complaint should not be dis-
missed. 
"The Court Concludes: 
"Plaintiff is entitled to an order over-
ruling the motions to strike made by defen-
dant Carnes. 
"That this Court cannot overrule the 
decision of another judge of the same 
Court and that consistent with the ruling 
of Judge Hall, defendant is entitled to a 
judgment quashing service of process on 
Carnes Corporation but not dismissing the 
Amended Complaint." 
Finding No. 1 is true but as a practical matter with Judge 
Hall on the Law and Motion Division of the Court, the counsel 
both knew that nothing more than the affidavits could be pre-
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sented to that division of the Court. Since the matter was 
not discussed before Judge Leary and no isse was raised in 
regard to that matter, he could not have known nor did he 
attempt to inform himself as to whether a hearing had been re-
quested before Judge Hall at which testimony could be siven. 
Finding No. 2 as a statement of broad general principal 
may be correct, but it was not in fact correct and Judge Leary 
did not request any enlightenment on this matter. No accusa-
tion was made that counsel had not proceeded properly nor was 
counsel asked to afford any explanation as to why discovery had 
not been undertaken prior to 1975. It must be remembered that 
Carnes had immediately, and within the time allowed by rule 
for a responsive pleading, filed its Motion to Dismiss and 
Quash Service of Summons. Counsel for Car~es took the position 
that discovery conducted by plaintiff after the filing of such 
a Motion would not be binding on Carnes because Carnes could 
not participate in such discovery as it did not recognize the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court and that therefore it did not 
have to participate in or be bound by any such discovery efforts. 
Finding No. 3 is not in conformity with the evidence. The 
facts did not lie within the knowledge of plaintiff. They had 
to be obtained from the witnesses who only became available to 
the plaintiff after a special hearing had been set and subpoenas 
could be issued, and were in fact issued. So long as the atti-
tude of counsel for Carnes was that discovery could not be con-
ducted which would be binding upon it, plaintiff could not 
proceed effectively. The resistance of all parties and wit-
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nesses to any voluntary disclosure could not be better demon-
strated than by the immediate reaction of Long Del'ling Utah, Inc., 
which through its counsel immediately sought a protective order 
and proceeded to contest the right of the plaintiff to any infor-
mation concerning the transactions involving the Church Office 
Building or involving Long Deming's relationship to Carnes. 
(R99-101) It was only when Judge Hanson ruled that Carnes had 
made a general appearance and was subject to the JUrlsdiction 
of the Court that any meaningful discovery became possible. In 
open Court, Judge Hanson was informed by all counsel, including 
counsel for Long Deming, that by reason of his ruling, considera-
tion of most of the matters raised by Long Deming's Motion for 
Protective Order had been rendered moot, and Judge Hanson in-
corporated this into his Order: 
.. and the Court having announced its 
dlsposition of the aforesaid motions and 
it thereupon being stipulated in open 
court by the attorney for the Plaintiff, 
Allen H. Tibbals, and the attorney for 
the defendant, Long Deming Utah, Inc., 
for the protective order and to quash 
request for the production of certain 
documents was rendered in part moot by 
the decision of the court on the prior 
motions and that any remaining issues 
the counsel believed could be resolved 
by conference ... " (R65-66) 
The issue of whether or not counsel for Brown had ~roperl~ 
conducted the discovery proceedings and had ~roceeded in a 
correct manner was neither raised, argued or presented to Judge 
Leary. Likewise, Judge Leary was not asked to pass upon the 
question of whether he could or could not 'overrule the declSl0° 
of Judge Hall. The issue of the status cf the matter before 
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Judge Hall had been preserved for ulti~ate conslderation by the 
Supreme Court. It was not submitted to Judge Leary. He was 
acting under the Order of Judge Dee and was mandated by that 
Order to make a determination of whether Carnes had or had not 
by its conduct and contacts submitted itself to the jurisdiction 
of the Utah Courts and whether or not the sales representatives 
under contract with Carnes to act as such were qualified as 
?ersons upon whom Service of Summons could be had to secure 
Jurisdiction over Carnes. 
It has long been recognized as elementary in the law that 
relief cannot be granted by the Court upon its own motion on 
issues neither raised or tried. 
" ... While it is true that our rules pro-
vide for liberality in procedure and the 
sranting of relief to which the evidence 
shows a party entitled, this does not go 
so far as to authorize the granting of 
relief on issues neither raised nor tried." 
Cornia vs. Cornia, 546 ?2d 890 at 893. 
The Oregon Supreme Court has similarly held: 
"It is well settled that the pleadings 
may be introduced to show lvhat was ad-
judicated, and in the absence of con-
flicting evidence they are, of course, 
conclusive. It is elementary law that 
the relief granted must necessarily be 
responsive to and in conformity with the 
pleadings and proof. (citing other cases)" 
Jarvis vs. Indemnity Insurance Co. of 
North America, 227 Ore. 508, 363 P2d 
740 at 743. 
The Order of Judge Dee under which the matter was pre-
sented to Judge Leary did not call for Judge Leary to pass upon 
any of the matters which he incorporated in this manner into 
his decision. Objections to the decision and the proposed 
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order by Judge Leary were duly filed by counsel for Brown. 
(R342-347) A hearing was held thereon and Judge Lear~ admltted 
the Order presented did not express his intent1on: 
"But I would--do make this comment 1-'r. 
Moyle; that I don't think thot the 
Order which was prepared for the Court's 
signature prcisely sets forth what t~e 
Court intended by its ~emorandum deci-
sion ... " (R395) 
However, Judge Leary did not rectify the Order. It was filed 
as originally presented and Appellant's objPctions •.;ere 0·:er-
ruled. (RJ57) -Judge Leary's action •.:as er-roneous and should be 
reversed. Fortunately, the factuol dat2 obtained at tnE 
hearing before Judge Leary is available for t~e review and 
consideration of this Court in determining Justice and equity 
between the parties. (R397, 675, Ex. l-25 inc.) 
CONCLCSIOcl 
We respectfully submit that a sense of fair play and 
justice and equity require that this Court find that Carnes 
has done business within the State of Utah in such a manner 
as to subject it to the jurisdiction of the l'ta;1 Courts. Tile 
duration and vagaries of the battle before the lower Court 
and on Interlocutory Appeal to this Court should not obscure 
the essential necessity of recognizing the rights of the parties 
to fair and impartial consideration of the issues. The facts 
as developed support the jurisdiction of the Ctah Court over 
the controversy between Brown, Carnes and Long Deming Uta~. 
Inc. We ask that this honorable Court so rule and mandate this 
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action to the lower Court for a trial upon the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of January, 1979. 
TIBBALS AND STATEN 
C~L __ 
~/ft//_. 
CR.A G .ADAMS~-----­
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
Ted R. Brmm and Associates, Inc. 
220 South 200 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
Received two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appella~t. 
TED R. BROvlc:! AND ASSOCIATES, INC., this day of January, 
1979. 
MOYLE & DP-APER 
0. WOOD HOYLE II I 
REID E. LEIVIS 
Received~ copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, 
TED R. BRO\n AtlD ASSOCIATES, INC., this ___ day of Januar:· • 
1979. 
ROBERT D. MERRILL 
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